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Introduction
Throughout the history of Christian doctrine, the cross of Christ has
proved to be a magnet for widespread theological interpretation.   We pos-
sess Irenaeus’s recapitulation theory, Gregory of Nyssa’s fish-hook theory,
Athanasius’s mystical theory, Augustine’s ransom theory, Abelard’s
moral-influence theory, Anselm’s satisfaction theory, Scotus’s acceptilation
theory, and Calvin’s theory of penal substitution, to name only a few of the
historical stand-outs.1 Since the Reformation, divergent views of the aton-
ing work of Christ have ballooned all the more, with the typical battle line
drawn between objective and subjective theories.2 Even philosophers have
gotten into the fray.  Kant and Kierkegaard each have extended discus-
sions of the atonement, and in contemporary, analytic philosophy, the likes
of Philip Quinn, Eleonore Stump, Richard Swinburne, John Hare, and
David Lewis have published on the doctrine of the atonement.3
While no one theory of the atonement has received the stamp of ortho-
doxy within Christendom, amongst many conservative Christians various
versions of the theory of penal substitution continue to rule the day.4 And
yet, outside of these conservative circles, the notion of penal substitution is
dismissed out of hand.  Keith Ward, for instance, represents a fairly com-
mon stance, “One must therefore reject those crude accounts of Christian
doctrine which…say that Christ has been justly punished in our place so
that he has taken away our guilt and enabled God to forgive us.  Almost
everything is ethically wrong about these accounts.”5 Many of us simply
cannot swallow the idea of a God who is unable to deal with his anger over
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This paper is a philosophical defense of the doctrine of penal substitution.  I
begin with a delineation of Richard Swinburne’s satisfaction-type theory of
the atonement, exposing a weakness of it which motivates a renewed look at
the theory of penal substitution.  In explicating a theory of penal substitution, I
contend that: (i) the execution of retributive punishment is morally justified in
certain cases of deliberate wrongdoing; (ii) deliberate human sin against God
constitutes such a case; and (iii) the transfer of the retributive punishment due
sinners to Christ is morally coherent.  Whatever else might be said for and
against such a conception of the doctrine of the atonement, the plausibility of
the theory presented here should give us pause in the often hasty rejection of
the doctrine of penal substitution.
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sin in any other way than by doling out punishment to sinners or to the
incarnate Christ as a penal substitute.
While I am sympathetic to such sentiments, I am equally moved by the
historical legacy of penal accounts of the atonement and the corresponding
biblical evidence in favor of such understandings of the cross of Christ.
Furthermore, and more germane to this present paper, the doctrine of
penal substitution offers a rationale for the cross that appears lacking on
rival accounts.  There is, of course, much more to the person and work of
Christ as the means of salvation than merely his death on the cross for
human sin, but this latter notion remains a central biblical and theological
theme that deserves careful delineation.  Since many have found the idea
of penal substitution to be morally suspect, my aim here is to take a further
step towards a contemporary philosophical defense of the doctrine.6
One of the most recent and most compelling attempts to put forth a
philosophical defense of Christ’s atonement is found in Richard
Swinburne’s Responsibility and Atonement.  While Swinburne’s theory is not
a penal view of the atonement, Swinburne does present Christ’s person
and work as a means to satisfy the moral debt sinners owe to God.  In so
doing, I will argue that Swinburne prepares the ground for a plausible
understanding of the doctrine of penal substitution.  In the critical part of
this paper I lay out Swinburne’s satisfaction-type theory and surface one
central weakness of it—a weakness which provides some motivation for a
renewed look at the doctrine of penal substitution.  This leads to the con-
structive part of the paper in which I attempt to harness Swinburne’s
methodological approach to atonement theorizing and put it to work in
favor of a theory of penal substitution.
I. Swinburne’s Theory
The essential dilemma of the atonement is clearly stated by St. Anselm in
Cur Deus Homo?, “If God could not save sinners except by condemning a
just man, where is his omnipotence?  If, on the other hand, he was capable
of doing so, but did not will it, how shall we defend his wisdom and jus-
tice?”7 Anselm takes the first horn of the dilemma arguing that despite
God’s omnipotence it was morally impossible for him to save sinners with-
out the satisfaction of Christ.  Swinburne takes the second horn.  On his
view, God could have forgiven the sins of humanity in various morally
suitable ways, it is simply that the means utilizing Christ’s life and death is
one of those suitable ways.9 God’s wisdom and justice are vindicated for
while the requirement of Christ’s life and death is not morally obligatory
for the forgiveness of sins, it is a morally fitting condition for the forgive-
ness of those sins.
In setting out his case, Swinburne first analyzes the process of atone-
ment in the human context and he then applies the resultant understand-
ing to the case of God and sinners.  Through an appeal to common moral
intuitions in cases of intentional and unintentional wrongdoing,
Swinburne contends that wrongdoers owe their victims a certain kind of
response.  For instance, if I borrow your car and I accidentally smash the
front end into a concrete wall, upon returning it to you I cannot merely
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hand you the keys and walk away without addressing what has happened.
Nor can I casually mention the damage and attempt to laugh it off.  Of
course, I can do either of these things, it is just that I shouldn’t.  Something
would be morally amiss with either of these responses.  This is because,
Swinburne urges, I am morally indebted to you due to my offense and I
owe you some kind of proper repayment.  I am in a state of objective guilt
before you for I have failed in my duty to handle your property well.9
Swinburne suggests that in unintentional wrongdoing wrongdoers owe
the offended party at least an apology and reparation if possible.  In apolo-
gy I publicly distance myself from my act by sincerely disowning my
wrongdoing to you.  And in reparation I seek to remove the consequences
of the harm as much as is logically possible.  If my wrongdoing is deliber-
ate, then I owe you even more than apology and reparation.  For in deliber-
ate wrongdoing I have a malevolent attitude and purpose towards you
which adds a deeper offense to my already offensive act.  Hence, I must
repent and also perform penance.  In repentance I privately acknowledge
the wrongness of my act and I resolve not to act in such a way again.  And
in penance I go beyond what is required in reparation and I give you a
costly gift as a demonstration that my previous steps towards reconcilia-
tion were meant and serious.10
Swinburne writes that these four components of atonement—repen-
tance, apology, reparation, and penance—are “all contributions to remov-
ing as much of the consequences of the past act as logically can be removed
by the wrongdoer” and by offering them the “wrongdoer has done what
he can towards removing his guilt…towards making him and the victim at
one again.”11 The final act of ‘at-one-ment’ is the victim’s decision whether
or not to forgive the wrongdoer on the basis of his gift of atonement.12
Forgiveness for Swinburne occurs when the victim changes his disposition
towards the wrongdoer such that the victim undertakes to treat the wrong-
doer as no longer the originator of the wrong act.13 It is in virtue of the vic-
tim’s forgiveness that the wrongdoer’s guilt is removed.
Swinburne holds that with serious wrongs, it is bad for a victim to
attempt to forgive without some form of atonement on the part of the
wrongdoer, for this trivializes human relationships and the importance of
right action by not taking the wrongdoer and the wrong done seriously.14
So the victim must at least require an apology from the wrongdoer, and if
the act was intentional, repentance as well.  Beyond this, the victim has it
within his power to determine, within limits, how much further atonement
is needed before he forgives.  The victim can forgive with just repentance
and apology, or he can insist on some degree of reparation and penance
before granting forgiveness.  Sometimes it is good that the victim require
substantive reparation and penance, for that allows the wrongdoer the
opportunity to take seriously the harm he has done.15
Swinburne applies this general view of atonement to the divine/human
relationship.  The idea here is that human sinners have acquired guilt
before God in failing to live their lives well.  Just as children owe it to their
parents to do what they say, do what will please them, and make some-
thing worthwhile of their lives, a fortiori, humans have a duty to God to
obey his commands, do what will please him, and live a virtuous life.16 For
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God is our ultimate benefactor in that our existence and all that we have
depends on him.  So when we fail in any duty to our fellows, we fail to live
a good life, and thus, we fail in our duty to God.  Such a failure of one’s
duty to God is to sin.17
Moreover, Swinburne assumes that “God seeks man’s eternal well-
being in friendship with himself”, and that God has worthwhile tasks with
which humans can participate.18 For instance, we can help God in reconcil-
ing others to himself and to one another, we can grow in the contemplation
of God and his universe, and we can help in beautifying the universe.
Since these great opportunities are available to us, we do a great wrong to
God in failing to take steps towards fulfilling these ends.
Thus, Swinburne holds that we have failed to fulfil our duties to God,
“badly abusing” the opportunities he has given us.19 We owe God first-
rate lives, though we live second-rate lives at best.  And so, human persons
are sinners, they are in debt to God because of their sins, and they are
obligated to make atonement to God for their wrongdoing.20 Swinburne
writes, “it is good that if we do wrong, we should take proper steps to cancel
our actions, to pay our debts, as far as logically can be done.”21 To just
walk away from God without addressing our sins is morally inappropri-
ate.
Similarly, it would be morally inappropriate for God to forgive our sins
without at least requiring repentance and apology.22 But since our actions
and their consequences matter, it is good for God not only to require
repentance and apology, but reparation and penance as well.  By doing so,
God takes sin seriously, treats us as responsible moral agents, and demon-
strates the value he places on the divine/human relationship.
But because of the extent of reparation and penance needed, sinners
are unable to make it.  We need help from the outside.  God gives us this
help by providing a means of substantive reparation and penance.
Swinburne writes:
If [a] child has broken the parent’s window and does not have the
money to pay for a replacement, the parent may give him the money
wherewith to pay a glazier to put in a new window…and thereby
make due reparation.  The parent can refuse to accept the apology
until the window is mended.  Thereby he allows the child to take his
action and its consequence…as seriously as he can in the circum-
stances of the child’s initial inability to pay.  That treats the child as a
responsible agent, and it treats the harm done as a harm.  It treats
things as they are.23
Since Christ’s life and death are traditionally seen as the means of atone-
ment for human sins, Swinburne concludes that God has provided the vol-
untarily offered life and death of Christ as a means for sinners to offer sub-
stantive reparation and penance.24 Since the wrongs done were human
lives lived imperfectly, it was fitting for a life lived perfectly to be offered
as reparation and penance.25 It is only when sinners combine their repen-
tance and apology with pleading the atoning work of Christ as a means of
reparation and penance that God forgives them their sins and their guilt is
removed.
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Swinburne’s theory clearly articulates an intuitively compelling under-
standing of atonement.  It does seem good that victims of wrongdoing con-
dition their forgiveness at times on not only repentance and apology, but
also substantive reparation and penance.  Since sinners are unable to pro-
vide this, God in Christ offers them a way to realize the goods of such
reparation and penance.  It is not that it is necessary for God to forgive sin-
ners in this manner, but it is a fitting way for him to do so amongst other
fitting ways given God’s overall intentions for human salvation.
But this otherwise plausible move generates a weakness.  On
Swinburne’s theory God could freely choose any valuable act to serve as
reparation and penance.  Swinburne writes:
…it is the victim of wrongdoing—in this case God—who has a right
to choose, up to the limit of the equivalent to the harm done and the
need for a little more in penance, how much reparation and penance
to require before he will forgive.  So, despite all of these considera-
tions about man’s inability to make substantial reparation and
penance, God could have chosen to accept one supererogatory act of
an ordinary man as adequate for the sins of the world.  Or he could
have chosen to accept some angel’s act for this purpose.26
In fact, God could have required merely Christ’s valuable life for this pur-
pose without requiring the crucifixion.  Surely all the good acts of Christ’s
life as well as the suffering and humility he endured in the incarnation con-
stitute a substantive gift to offer as reparation and penance.  So, since the
goods obtained by Christ offering reparation and penance on behalf of sin-
ners could be accomplished without his suffering and death, it is implausible
to think that a good God would require such an event for forgiveness.27 For
a voluntary sacrifice of life is not a morally valuable act unless there is some
good purpose that can only or best be achieved by means of it.  Since the
goods of reparation and penance can be achieved without Christ’s death, it
would appear that his voluntary death was either foolish or suicidal.28
Swinburne does contend that Christ’s life and death are a peculiarly
appropriate means for reparation and penance in that they make up a per-
fect human life offered up for persons who led ruinous lives.29 The idea
here is that since the best reparation and penance are closely connected
with the harm done, a perfect human life is apropos when the harms done
were the imperfect lives of human persons.
While this seems right, it is not clear why Christ’s death is an important
part of his perfect human life.  Would Christ’s life have been less perfect if
he had ascended into the heavens right after, say, the Garden of
Gethsemane?  If Christ’s death was voluntary, as Swinburne assumes, then
I fail to see how his going to the cross is a part of his living a perfect human
life when the goods of substantive reparation and penance could be equal-
ly well-served by his life alone.  One might think that if Christ had avoided
the cross, then Christ would be seen as having dodged the inevitable result
of the kind of life he led.  But dodging bullets—even inevitable ones—
seems a virtue, unless there is some good purpose to take the bullet.  Since
Christ’s life alone accomplishes the goods of substantive reparation and
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penance, Swinburne’s view of the atonement provides no good reason for
Christ to voluntarily go to the cross.
Of course, there might be some other good purpose or purposes which
the cross served which made it a valuable act, and thus, rendered it capa-
ble of being a part of the reparation and penance offered to God on behalf
of sinners.  But Swinburne does not suggest what these other possible
goods may be.  And whatever they may be, it will always seem that they
could be achieved equally well without Christ’s death.  It appears essential
for Swinburne’s case that he spell out some great goods which could only
or best be achieved by the death of Christ, or else there will be no sufficient
reason for Christ going to the cross nor God requiring it for forgiveness.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that Swinburne does capture a salient fea-
ture of the atonement process, namely, that we owe God righteous lives
and that Christ’s righteous life—his active obedience—serves as a satisfac-
tion of our debt.  But I have contended that such an atonement scheme fails
to make sense of Christ’s voluntary death—his passive obedience.  If all we
need is Christ’s righteous life as satisfaction for our moral debt to God,
then the crucifixion would be at best inconsequential as regards the for-
giveness of sins and at worse a completely worthless act.  What is needed
is an atonement theory more intrinsically related to Christ’s suffering and
death on the cross.
II. The Doctrine of Penal Substitution
Given this particular weakness of Swinburne’s theory, there arises some
motivation to investigate the doctrine of penal substitution.  For a penal
understanding of the cross of Christ manifests a clear connection between
the death of Christ and the forgiveness of human sin.30 If moral sense can
be made of the idea that the punishment of sinners is what God requires
for forgiveness and that this punishment was provided for in the crucifix-
ion of Christ, then, whatever else this conception of the atonement may
have in its favor, it plainly establishes a lucid rationale for Christ’s volun-
tary sacrifice.  In what follows, I will first argue for a moral framework that
makes sense of the infliction of penal consequences on wrongdoers, and
then apply this framework to the case of God and sinners.  I will conclude
with a defense of the coherence of transferring punishment from a guilty
party to an innocent party.
Victims of wrongdoing (or rightful representatives of those victims) have
a retributive right to punish their wrongdoers.  Perhaps harkening back to
the example in which I borrow your car will helpfully illustrate this some-
what controversial point.  Let us say that this time I deliberately crash your
car because I am jealous of you.  Now all of what Swinburne says would
seem to apply.  I am in moral debt to you and I ought to repent, apologize,
and seek to make reparation and penance.  I owe this to you and just as it
would be good of me to offer it to you, so too it would be good of you to
require such an atonement process as a condition of your forgiveness.
But while it seems clear that I owe you this kind of response, it also
seems clear that I deserve more than this.  For even after engaging in the
Swinburnian atonement process, it seems permissible for you to withdraw
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my car-borrowing privileges.  I certainly don’t deserve the privilege after
what I have done, and in fact it appears that I deserve to lose that privi-
lege—at least for a time.  Due to my misuse of a certain privilege, you have
the right to withdraw that privilege from me.  Now, of course, you could
let me borrow your car again after I’ve engaged in the Swinburnian atone-
ment process, but when you do so you graciously pass over what I other-
wise rightly deserve.
As another example, take the unfaithful husband who comes to his wife
repentant, apologetic, and willing to make reparation and penance for his
adultery.  It seems permissible for the wife to accept these steps towards
reconciliation but to nevertheless demand that he move out of the family
home—at least for a time.  The wife may say to her husband, “I will forgive
you, but for now, pack your things and get out of the house.”  If there was
a debate about whether or not this was fair, I take it that we would side
with the wife.  For it appears that the husband deserves to be treated in
such a manner—he deserves to lose certain rights and privileges of family
life due to his misuse of those rights and privileges.
This analysis seems to suggest that intentional wrongdoers have a fur-
ther moral debt to their victims—what might be called a penal debt.31 For
even after intentional wrongdoers repent, apologize, and make reparation
and penance in response to what they owe their victims, they often deserve
further loss.  Due to the fact that they have deliberately misused certain
rights and/or privileges, they deserve to have those rights and/or privi-
leges withdrawn.  Thus, it is permissible for victims of deliberate wrongdo-
ing to demand that the deserved loss be exacted from their wrongdoers.
Retributive punishment, then, is the forcible withdrawal of certain rights
and/or privileges from a wrongdoer in response to the intentional misuse
of those rights and/or privileges by the wrongdoer.
But what is morally permissible is not always morally fitting.  In other
words, while victims of wrongdoing have a prima facie retributive right to
punish, the moral justification for exercising that right depends on the ulti-
mate moral worth or fittingness of such punishment.32 Thankfully, there
are times when the withholding of punishment, and hence the manifesta-
tion of mercy, is of ultimate moral worth.  But there are other times in
which great moral worth can be located in executing rightful punishment.
While the potential utilitarian ends of retributive punishment are well-
known (deterrence, rehabilitation, and prevention), there are also what
might be called intrinsic ends that are secured in all cases of rightful, ret-
ributive punishment.  For to demand that a wrongdoer suffer the loss that
he deserves takes the harm done with due moral seriousness; it treats the
wrongdoer as a responsible moral agent; and it expresses the value of the
victim as well as the value of the personal relationship involved.33 This in
turn provides the wrongdoer the opportunity to take himself, his act, the
victim, and the relationship involved with due moral seriousness by his
abiding by and perceiving the justice of the enforced demands.  In the case
of serious wrongdoing or repeated offenses, the absence of punishment
can trivialize all of these elements.34
So when the wife demands that her unfaithful husband moves out of
the family home, she takes the harm done with appropriate seriousness;
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she treats her husband as responsible for the consequences of his actions;
and she expresses or vindicates the true value of herself and her marriage
relationship both of which her husband had devalued in his adultery.
Furthermore, she provides the opportunity for her husband to recognize
the moral import of all of these things.  If the wife does not exact some kind
of punishment like that described, she runs risk of trivializing the impor-
tance of right action, responsibility, and the other moral values involved.   
Having argued that there are situations in which retributive punish-
ment is morally appropriate amongst human persons, the question now
becomes whether God is in such a situation vis-a-vis sinners.  As
Swinburne argues, humans have failed in their duties to God, and are
therefore in debt to him.  What we owe God are lives lived well, rather
than the second-rate lives we do live.  But more than simply owing God
good lives we cannot produce, we do not deserve to have the lives that
have been given to us.
Assuming that earthly human life is a good and gracious gift of God
and that the opportunity for loving relationship with himself is the highest
good bar none, then to intentionally abuse the goods and opportunities of
earthly human life, including the spiteful rejection of God’s offer of eternal
friendship, is a clear misuse of the rights and privileges we have been
given by God.  Granting the above argumentation, it is permissible for God
to forcibly withdraw the rights and privileges of human life on earth and
the opportunity for relationship with himself.  For we deserve to lose these
things due to our misuse of them.  If I come in late from working all day to
my wife’s welcome embrace and a well-prepared dinner, only to push her
away and throw the food on the floor in disgust, I certainly do not deserve
such generous treatment again.  Just as my wife would be right to with-
draw her good gifts, so too God would be right to withdraw the good gifts
of human life in friendship with himself from those who abuse and reject
it.35 To put the matter in theological terms, we deserve the divine punish-
ment of physical and spiritual death.  That is, we deserve to be physically
separated from the goods and opportunities of earthly human life and we
deserve to be spiritually separated from God’s loving presence.
At this point I am not prepared to argue that such punishment is obliga-
tory.  In fact, I am prone to agree with Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin that
God could forgive our sins without exacting such loss.36 Nevertheless, it is
morally permissible for him to exact the loss due us, and there is great
moral worth in him doing so.  For, parallel to the previous cases, such an
exaction of loss takes human sin seriously, it treats sinners as responsible
moral agents, and it vindicates or expresses the appropriate value of both
the Godhead and the divine/human relationship.  The result of this is that
the sinner has the opportunity to be morally educated and formed, and the
provision of this opportunity is good even if sinners are unwilling to recog-
nize the correct moral values which are expressed in the punishment.37
So at this point I have attempted to argue that there is a plausible concep-
tion of retributive punishment that makes punishment permissible in cases
of intentional wrongdoing and that certain intrinsic good ends are involved
in the exercise of such punishment.  Granting this theory of punishment, I
have argued that God is in such a position with sinners.  What is left is to
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show the moral coherence of transferring such punishment to Christ.
The substitution aspect of penal substitution has been bothersome to
many.  As Brian Hebblethwaite declares:
What sort of judge can impose death on another or even on himself
as a substitutory punishment, thus letting me go free?  Such ideas are
morally objectionable in their analogical base—the purely human
context—before ever they get transferred, by analogy, to the divine-
human context; and a fortiori, they make no moral sense when predi-
cated of a God of love.38
So, first off, is such a transfer of punishment from a guilty party to an inno-
cent party right or permissible in the human context?  While it is a fairly
trivial objection, it has been suggested that it is a logical impossibility to
punish the innocent.  For instance, Anthony Quinton writes, “For the
necessity of not punishing the innocent is not moral but logical.  It is not, as
some retributivists think, that we may not punish the innocent and ought
only to punish the guilty, but that we cannot punish the innocent and must
only punish the guilty.”39 So Quinton is claiming that it is part of the mean-
ing of the word ‘punish’ that the one inflicted must be guilty.  But as R.M.
Hare points out, even if we mistakenly punish an innocent person, they
were nevertheless punished.40 This is what makes such a situation tragic.
So the claim that punishment must only be of the guilty is not a logical
claim, contra Quinton, but a moral one.  It is not logically impossible to
punish an innocent person whom we think is guilty, rather it is morally
egregious to do so just because it is logically possible.
But the case of substitutionary punishment is not of this kind.  The idea
here is that someone voluntarily takes the guilty one’s place for the punish-
ment the guilty one deserves.  It would seem that the only possible way
such a transfer of punishment could be just is if the substitute voluntarily
and with sound mind accepts the penalty.  But given that the substitute
meets these conditions, I fail to see what is unjust about such a transfer.
Since punishment, on the view I have sketched, is the exercise of a retribu-
tive right in order to accomplish certain good ends, how one goes about
executing this right appears somewhat flexible.  For on this view, there is
no absolute principle of justice which necessitates punishment in response
to wrongdoing.  Punishment is permissible in response to wrongdoing, but
it is ultimately motivated by the moral goods which can be brought about
through it.  Hence, the victim, within limits, has the freedom to decide to
what extent and in what manner to inflict punishment.  I do not see how
this freedom would not extend to accepting a voluntary penal substitute.
Take for instance the football player who is late to team practice.  The
coach of the team punishes the late player by demanding he run 5 laps
around the field.  The team captain steps forward and asks the coach if he
could run the 5 laps in the other’s stead.  If the coach agrees to such an
arrangement, then there does not seem to be anything unjust about this
transfer of penalty.  I take it this is because in the transfer the initial justifi-
cation for punishment is still in place—that is, the late player’s misuse of
his team-privileges led to the temporary withdrawal of a team-privilege.
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Whether the late player or the team captain serves the punishment, the ini-
tial justification is the same.  And the additional good ends that the punish-
ment is likely to secure (e.g. team unity) are accomplished whether the late
player runs the laps or the team captain runs them.
It is clear in this example that part of what makes a penal transfer just is
that the infliction of punishment is the right of the one offended and it does
not have to be executed.  This opens up logical space for the exercise of
punishment to take on various forms.  What motivates the vicarious form
is that the good ends which justify the punishment of the one who
deserves it are also served in the punishment of the substitute.     
But the practice of penal substitution in other scenarios seems wrong.
We do not think it good for the mother of a convicted rapist to serve his
time in prison.  I propose that the reason why such a transfer is morally
counter-intuitive is that while the victim still has the right to transfer the
punishment, the likely good ends of such punishment would not be served
by such a transfer.  Given that deterrence and prevention are the main
potential goods of criminal punishment, it is probably never good that
such a penalty be transferred, for there is little hope of achieving these
goods through a transfer.41
But the same good ends are not at issue in the divine/human situation,
and so it may be good for Christ to voluntarily serve the kind of punish-
ment that is due sinners.  Christ’s voluntary submission to the crucifixion
coupled with his human experience of alienation from the Father is the
kind of physical and spiritual death sinners deserve.  It seems fair to say
that Christ experienced on the cross the loss of the good gifts and opportu-
nities of human life in friendship with God.  These are the rights and privi-
leges we abused, and it seems that they are the rights and privileges Christ
gave up on the cross in our stead.  On the view of punishment I have
sketched, God as the victim of wrongdoing can decide to what extent and
in what manner the punishment we deserve should be executed.  As long
as Christ voluntarily and with sound mind offers his death as the punish-
ment we deserve and as long as God considers it in this way, there does
not seem to be any injustice in this arrangement.  In God demanding and
Christ taking on the kind punishment we deserve in our place, human sin
is taken with utter seriousness, sinners are treated as responsible moral
agents, and the high value of the Godhead and the divine/human relation-
ship is expressed.  Moreover, sinners are provided the opportunity in the
cross to recognize the gravity of their offense, to realize their responsibility
before God, to grasp the great value of the Godhead and the
divine/human relationship, and in all of this to become aware of the riches
of God’s mercy, grace, and love.
Conclusion
What I have attempted to do in this paper is surface a central weakness in
Swinburne’s theory of the atonement which motivates a renewed look at
the doctrine of penal substitution.  Given this motivation, I have proposed a
moral framework in which human sinners deserve and God is morally jus-
tified in executing retributive punishment.  But due to the intrinsic ends of
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such retributive punishment and God’s right to determine the extent and
manner in which the punishment should be executed, I have maintained
that Christ’s voluntary death on the cross can be plausibly understood as
the punishment human sinners deserve.  So while Swinburne’s satisfaction
theory of the atonement presents a helpful construal of how Christ’s active
obedience provides the righteous lives we owe to God, the theory of penal
substitution presents a helpful construal of how Christ’s passive obedience
provides the kind of punishment we deserve to suffer. Whatever else might
be said for and against such a conception of the doctrine of the atonement,
the plausibility of the theory presented here should give us pause in the
often hasty rejection of the doctrine of penal substitution.42
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